The Courts and Tribunals Bill cleared its second reading in the face of fierce and principled opposition. That opposition was not confined to one party or one wing of the legal community. It reflected a broad and deeply held concern that, in seeking to relieve pressure on the system, the government is in fact putting at risk some of its most fundamental safeguards. As the bill now moves into committee on 25 March, those concerns have only sharpened. It is not a measured reform. It is a misstep.
Ministers have argued that these proposals are necessary to tackle delay and reduce the backlog in the Crown Court. However, necessity cannot be a licence for constitutional carelessness. Any proposal that dilutes this fundamental component of our justice system must meet a very high bar of justification. This bill does not meet that bar.
Since second reading, the intervention of the lady chief justice has been particularly striking. Her warning that aspects of the bill risk jeopardising the security of judges should give ministers pause. The proposals would require judges, at an early stage, to form and articulate views about the likely seriousness of a case and the sentence that might follow a conviction. In doing so, they are drawn into a position that could expose them to heightened scrutiny and, potentially, personal risk. At a time when public discourse is often febrile, that is not a hypothetical concern.
More fundamentally, the bill risks politicising the judiciary in a way that should trouble anyone who values the separation of powers. If more cases are diverted away from juries and into trials before judges sitting alone, the spotlight on individual judicial decision-making will intensify. It is not difficult to foresee what follows. Verdicts will be pored over, compared, and categorised. In time, there is a real danger of crude league tables emerging, ranking judges by conviction rates or perceived severity. Who is the most 'lenient'? Who is the most 'harsh'? These are the kinds of questions that belong to political debate, not to the administration of justice. Once judges are drawn into that arena, the damage to public confidence may be lasting.
The strength of the opposition to these measures within the legal profession should not be underestimated. Practitioners, from the criminal bar to solicitors on the frontline, understand the practical realities of the system. Many have expressed deep frustration, indeed anger, that proposals of such consequence have been brought forward without sufficient regard to their operational impact or constitutional implications. This is not resistance to change for its own sake. It is a warning, from those who know the system best, that this change risks doing real harm.
There are also serious practical flaws at the heart of the bill. The proposed mechanism requires a judge to determine, at an early stage, whether a defendant is likely, if convicted, to receive a sentence of three years or more. That is no simple gateway decision. It necessitates hearing argument from both prosecution and defence, considering the nature of the alleged offence, and applying the relevant sentencing framework. A reasoned judgment must then be produced.
However, cases evolve. Evidence shifts. Charges are amended. What seemed, at the outset, to be a case crossing the sentencing threshold may look very different by the time it reaches trial. At that point, the court may need to revisit the earlier determination and potentially reallocate the case. Each step adds delay. Each step consumes already stretched resources. And each step imposes an emotional burden on all involved; witnesses who must prepare and re-prepare, complainants seeking closure, and defendants living under prolonged uncertainty.
Far from simplifying the process, the bill risks entrenching a new layer of complexity. It front-loads difficult judicial decisions into a stage of proceedings where uncertainty is often at its greatest. In doing so, it may exacerbate the very delays it is meant to cure.
Perhaps most troubling of all is the shift in tone that has accompanied this debate. Increasingly, those advocating for these reforms speak of 'offenders' when what they mean are 'defendants'. That is not a trivial distinction. It goes to the heart of our system. A defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty. To speak otherwise is to invert that principle and to risk embedding a presumption of guilt into both policy and practice.
We should be wary of any reform that depends, even implicitly, on such a shift. The legitimacy of our justice system rests not only on efficiency but on fairness, and on the visible commitment to fairness at every stage.
There is no doubt that our courts require reform. Delay is corrosive. Backlogs are unjust. However, the answer cannot be to weaken the safeguards that protect us all. Trial by jury, judicial independence, and the presumption of innocence are not optional features of our system. They are its foundation.
As the bill enters committee, the government should reflect carefully on the strength of the opposition it has encountered, from parliament, from the judiciary, and from the profession. These are not voices that should be lightly dismissed. Reform, to endure, must command confidence. This bill, in its current form, does not.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst MP is the Conservative Member of Parliament for Solihull West & Shirley, elected in 2024. He previously served as a British Army Medical Officer and barrister, and sits on the House of Commons Justice Committee
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