The court may, as part of its case management powers, order a stay of proceedings to allow the parties to engage with ADR (see Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil CBC [2023] EWCA Civ 1416 and relevant CPR). Whether to grant an order to stay proceedings in favour of ADR is a matter of discretion for the court and cannot be used by the parties to delay the progress of litigation, as the High Court made clear in Wilson v Stroud Green Housing Co-operative Ltd [2025] EWHC 1508 (KB).
W brought a defamation claim against the Housing Co-operative (HC). The limitation period for bringing defamation claims is 12 months and W issued proceedings just before the expiry of that period. W then applied to the court for a 12-month stay of proceedings to allow the parties to engage with ADR. Deputy Master Skinner KC, however, refused to stay the proceedings and ordered W to file and serve particulars of claim and to pay HC’s costs. W appealed and argued, inter alia, that the deputy master had failed to take account of the case of Hamon v University College London [2023] EWHC 1812 (KB) in which the High Court granted an eight-month stay for the claimants to engage with the Office of the Independent Adjudicator. The appeal came before Hill J.
Hill J rejected W’s appeal and upheld the master’s order. In doing so, she explained that defamation claims should be dealt with expeditiously and that a 12-month stay in such a case would be ‘extraordinary’. Hill J also observed that the master was entitled to consider the failure to file and serve particulars of claim as a failure to pursue the claim diligently. She noted that, although paragraph 17 of the Practice Direction on Pre-Action Conduct allows for a stay for the parties to engage with the protocol, it does not mandate a stay. Hill J distinguished the decision in Hamon on the grounds that that case concerned group litigation and contract claims, which involve longer limitation periods, and that the stay was granted at a more advanced stage of the litigation process. She also explained that the court must exercise its discretion when considering an application for a stay of proceedings and, in doing so, factors such as delay, the progress made by the parties, and the fairness to the other party were all relevant factors for the court to take into consideration. Hill J concluded that the master had given proper consideration to these factors and had correctly prioritised the progress of court proceedings over the uncertainty of a possible future settlement.
The decision in Wilson makes clear that an order for a stay of proceedings is not an absolute right – it will be for the court to decide, considering the specific circumstances of the case. The court will not grant a stay where it would undermine, delay or frustrate the litigation process. This does not mean that the parties cannot engage with an ADR process alongside the court proceedings or make an application for a stay at a later stage in the litigation process. However, a stay of proceedings cannot be used to try to delay the progress of court proceedings.
Masood Ahmed is an associate professor at the University of Leicester and a member of the Law Society’s Dispute Resolution Advisory Committee. Osman Mohammed BA (Political Science and International Relations), University of Birmingham, also contributed to this article
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