Setting aside disposition

F v F (S intervening) (Financial Provision: Bankruptcy: Reviewable Disposition) [2002] EWHC 2814 (Fam) [2003] 1 FLR 911, Mr Justice Coleridge; Trowbridge v Trowbridge [2003] 2 FLR 231, David Richards QC as deputy Chancery Division judge

There have been two recent sightings of the relatively rare application under section 37 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (setting aside a disposition intended to defeat a claim for financial relief).

In F v F, Mr Justice Coleridge held that a charge created by S (the husband's business partner and personal associate) over the former matrimonial home should be set aside, though S was given a third share in the property postponed to reflect the needs of the wife and children.

In Trowbridge, the former wife was owed a lump sum by the husband.

He had invested in a house in the sole name of his new wife.

Could the court find that he paid money for the new house intending to defeat the former wife's claims (note: the definition of defeating a claim in section 37(1) includes impeding enforcement of an order)?

Furthermore, had the husband acquired a beneficial interest in his second wife's house under a constructive or resulting trust? The judge said yes to both questions, enabling him to set aside the payments by the husband and to imply a trust in his second wife's house.

His former wife's charge upon his share could then be made absolute for the amounts still outstanding under her lump sum order.

Beck v Ministry of Defence (2003) The Times, 21 July, CA

Where a party to proceedings has permission to instruct an expert, but does not wish to use that expert's report, then permission to instruct a second expert should only be given on terms that the first, discarded expert's report be disclosed, said the Court of Appeal in Beck.

No room should be left for a party to believe that a report had been withheld because an expert was favourable to that party's case.

Limited disclosure for the safety of the child

Re W (Care proceedings: Disclosure) (2003) The Times, 21 July, Mr Justice Wall

In Re W (see [2003] Gazette, 18 September, 34), social workers were told by the police that a suspected drugs supplier was living at an address at which a mother and children, already involved in care proceedings, were living.

The local authority needed to tell the mother but did not want to disclose all that they knew.

They sought the court's guidance.

The effect of article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights was to require that disclosure be limited only in compelling circumstances, said Mr Justice Wall.

Thus, the mother's advisers were entitled to know the wider picture on their undertaking not to pass on information to the mother; and the mother must realise that she was prevented from publishing information to a third party by section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960.

The police should be able to give sensitive information to social workers, which could then be used in any way necessary to protect children.

Provision of information, which can only partially be passed on to a client, can create a real problem for the lawyer, since information which an adviser has on a case comes to him only because of acting for the client.

It is essential to take a client's instructions before receiving the information.

(See Re C (Disclosure) [1996] 1 FLR 797, where a child did not want her evidence to be known to her mother.

It was disclosed to the court, but not to the mother who refused to allow her solicitor to receive the information).

By David Burrows, David Burrows, Bristol