Animal welfare as a material consideration in planning law

The High Court’s recent judgment in Animal Equality UK v North East Lincolnshire Council & ASL New Clee Limited [2025] EWHC 1331 (Admin) adds a significant chapter to the evolving debate over the role of animal welfare in planning law. While the case ultimately dismissed a challenge to the UK’s first proposed onshore salmon farm, it reaffirms the principle that animal welfare can constitute a material planning consideration, even if its weight remains at the discretion of decision-makers. 

This decision rests within a growing body of law that is slowly expanding the boundaries of what planning authorities may legitimately take into account. The trajectory suggests that animal welfare, once seen as marginal to land-use planning, is gaining increasing legal recognition as part of the planning framework.

Edie Bowles of Advocates for Animals, the UK’s first animal protection law firm, represented the claimant, Animal Equality in the case. Alex Shattock of Landmark Chambers was instructed as counsel.

Background

Animal Equality UK, an NGO advocating for farmed animals, sought judicial review of North East Lincolnshire Council’s decision to grant planning permission for an intensive land-based salmon farm in Cleethorpes.

The organisation raised two key objections: environmental impacts (energy use, water abstraction and effluent discharge) and the suffering of salmon in high-density tanks, supported by expert evidence of disease, cannibalism and mass mortality risks in the event of system failures.

The council’s planning officer’s report acknowledged these representations but concluded that 'fish welfare and moral concerns' were 'not considered to be material land use planning considerations.' The committee approved the application by a majority.

The judicial review focused on whether the committee had been unlawfully misled into believing animal welfare was legally irrelevant.

The court’s reasoning

Deputy High Court Judge Ridge dismissed the claim.

She held that the officer’s report should be read as an expression of planning judgment, not a categorical legal ruling.

The phrasing 'not considered to be material' was said to indicate a professional opinion that animal welfare should not be taken into account in this case, rather than a blanket statement of law. It was said that the officer supported his conclusion by reference to existing regulatory regimes (e.g., Environment Agency, Fish Health Inspectorate), consistent with national policy discouraging duplication of controls. Finally, it was pointed out that planning committee members are trained and expected to understand that they retain discretion to depart from officer recommendations.

For the above reasons, it was found that the committee was not materially misled, and the decision stood.

Animal welfare as a material consideration

Although the claim failed, the judgment is significant for what it reaffirms: animal welfare concerns are legally capable of constituting a material consideration. The court accepted the well-established principle that planning committees may take such concerns into account if they choose to do so.

The roots of this principle can be traced to cases such as:

• R (Copeland) v Tower Hamlets [2010] EWHC 1845 (Admin), where public health objections to a fast-food outlet were held capable of being material.
• Stringer v Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1971] WLR 1281, which endorsed the idea that material planning considerations were not limited to amenity.
• More broadly, the Supreme Court in Friends of the Earth v Heathrow Airport [2020] UKSC 52 classified 'discretionary' considerations that decision-makers may lawfully take into account if rational.

Against this backdrop, the Animal Equality case confirms that welfare concerns relating to animals are not excluded from planning by law.

The emerging trend

The decision must be read alongside wider societal and legal developments. The UK’s Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022 acknowledges animals, including fish, as sentient beings and just as health, climate change, and sustainability have evolved into recognised planning considerations, animal welfare is now entering the frame.

Courts have consistently resisted imposing mandatory consideration of such issues, preferring to preserve planning committees’ discretion. Yet the trajectory is clear: welfare is gaining legal legitimacy as part of the planning calculus.

Implications for practitioners

For local authorities and developers it would be prudent for officer reports to acknowledge animal welfare when raised and clearly justify whether or not it is material in the given context. Over-reliance on regulatory regimes could risk being challenged, if the decision appears to close off consideration prematurely.

For animal protection campaigners and NGOs, the door is now wide open to argue welfare as a legitimate factor to refuse planning permission and challenge any decision where it appears that councillors may have been misled as to its relevance. In fact, since the Animal Equality case campaigners have successfully forced North Norfolk District Council to overturn the planning permission for a giant intensive poultry unit in Norfolk which was set to house 310,000 chickens, with one of the arguments being that the planning officer made a legal error in not considering animal welfare concerns. In addition, Cheshire East Council was forced to concede that the planning permission granted for a zoo was unlawful and when making the decision again the planning officer accepted that animal welfare concerns could be material for these types of decisions as a matter of law. Whilst the court continues to respect planning discretion, future cases may also test whether welfare can ever be so 'obviously material' that failure to consider it would be unlawful.

Conclusion

Animal Equality v North East Lincolnshire Council is not a defeat for animal welfare, but part of its gradual emergence in planning law. The High Court confirmed that welfare can be a material consideration. While the committee in this case chose not to give it weight, future committees may, and arguably should, treat welfare considerations more seriously, as public and legislative recognition of sentience continues to expand.

Edie Bowles is a solicitor at Advocates for Animals