This was not a good week for the US tech companies, and so – paradoxically – it was a good week for those who warn about the perils of overdependence on them. At the same time, it was the week when interesting solutions for the UK’s digital sovereignty were proposed. 

Jonathan Goldsmith

Jonathan Goldsmith

Among the tech perils, there was the accidental: the Microsoft outage, which gave users a holiday or a migraine, depending on perspective. It obviously impacted the legal sector. Cases in magistrates, Crown and civil courts were cancelled or delayed, as the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary relies on Microsoft platforms, including Outlook, for email. Jurors at a crown court in Manchester were sent home for the weekend on Friday morning as their case, in which nine men are on trial accused of raping a woman who was drugged by her husband, was abandoned for the day. Civil court cases, including in the family courts, were also affected, with planned judgments unable to be handed down, since they are usually sent by email. The Supreme Court itself is an Outlook user.

True, this could have happened with a UK-based provider, but there are none, and this provider was beyond our reach and control.

Microsoft Outlook app displayed on Mac desktop

The Microsoft outage obviously impacted the legal sector

Source: Alamy

Then, there was the apparently deliberate: President Zelensky of Ukraine reported that the speeds of Starshield, the satellite internet system developed by Elon Musk’s SpaceX and controlled by the US government, were restricted over Russian-occupied territories, damaging Ukraine’s drone ability in those territories. He said: ‘If you impose restrictions there, you are already partially recognising the temporarily occupied territories as not ours’. This came at roughly the same time as peace talks were taking place in Dubai, and was presumably meant to pressure Ukraine into agreeing certain terms. Starshield today, the UK legal system in the future when it yields decisions unwelcome to the US?

Finally, there was the outlandish: the removal of a lynchpin of AI infrastructure, Jensen Huang of Nvidia, as the result of a spying scandal, which showed that a person on whom the US economy and the future of AI has depended to such an extent was capable of misjudgements of catastrophic proportions. Interestingly, he led the lobbying against regulation of AI.

The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) stepped into this disturbing scene with impeccable timing with its proposals contained in a report called ‘Locked In – a realist’s agenda for digital sovereignty’. 

All those involved in the provision of legal services should read it and consider its recommendations before committing our legal system irrevocably to dependence on systems over which we have no control, and which have shown themselves over the past week to be undependable in one way or another.

The basic facts are startling. Less than one pound in six that the public sector spends through its biggest technology suppliers goes to firms that are British on every count. Of the spend that appears to go to UK firms, 43% goes straight to resellers, mostly of US big tech products. Technology profits mostly accrue at concentrated chokepoints in which the UK cannot compete, and many UK startups struggle to scale before being sold overseas.

Moving on to the politics, the US has previously weaponised its superiority over us by restricting access to the most advanced AI and asking labs to hold back new models from the UK AI Security Institute.

The IPPR outlines some limited options. Whereas some argue that the UK cannot compete and should accept dependence, negotiating the best access terms we can get, others say that the UK can aim for interdependence and with it more control, spreading reliance beyond just the US and building a UK technology stack that others depend on. Our strengths lie in AI applications, chip design and AI safety, which are valuable, but sit at diffuse layers of the technology stack where withholding access costs others little. As mentioned above, the UK is unlikely to be in control of a chokepoint.

The IPPR draws the obvious conclusion that it is now a realistic possibility that critical systems are cut off (presumably even our legal system, although that is not mentioned), that economic gains from transformative technology flow overseas, and that the UK is unable to regulate an increasingly dangerous technology on its own terms.

But the IPPR also makes several recommendations. For instance, we should obviously target industrial policy at sectors in which the UK can win, as mentioned above, and pool capabilities with other middle powers, by calling for a middle power coalition with more market leverage with France, Germany, the Nordics, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, Korea and Japan, with mutually guaranteed access terms.

The recommendations are beyond the legal sector’s ability to implement, but the message is clear, that we should not be hurrying as we are to commit our crucial legal system to utter dependence on foreign platforms and suppliers without mitigating measures.

 

Jonathan Goldsmith is Law Society Council member for EU & International, chair of the Law Society’s Policy & Regulatory Affairs Committee and a member of its board. All views expressed are personal and are not made in his capacity as a Law Society Council member, nor on behalf of the Law Society 

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